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One of the main challenges of embodied theories is accounting for meanings of abstract
words. The most common explanation is that abstract words, like concrete ones, are
grounded in perception and action systems. According to other explanations, abstract
words, differently from concrete ones, would activate situations and introspection; alter-
natively, they would be represented through metaphoric mapping. However, evidence
provided so far pertains to speciﬁc domains. To be able to account for abstract words
in their variety we argue it is necessary to take into account not only the fact that language
is grounded in the sensorimotor system, but also that language represents a linguistic–
social experience.To study abstractness as a continuum we combined a concrete (C) verb
with both a concrete and an abstract (A) noun; and an abstract verb with the same nouns
previously used (grasp vs. describe a ﬂower vs. a concept). To disambiguate between the
semantic meaning and the grammatical class of the words, we focused on two syntac-
tically different languages: German and Italian. Compatible combinations (CC, AA) were
processed faster than mixed ones (CA, AC). This is in line with the idea that abstract and
concrete words are processed preferentially in parallel systems – abstract in the language
system and concrete more in the motor system, thus costs of processing within one
system are the lowest. This parallel processing takes place most probably within differ-
ent anatomically predeﬁned routes. With mixed combinations, when the concrete word
preceded the abstract one (CA), participants were faster, regardless of the grammatical
class and the spoken language. This is probably due to the peculiar mode of acquisition
of abstract words, as they are acquired more linguistically than perceptually. Results con-
ﬁrm embodied theories which assign a crucial role to both perception–action and linguistic
experience for abstract words.
Keywords: abstract concepts, embodiment, social–linguistic experience, cross-language comparison, parallel
processing
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between “abstract” and “concrete” concepts and
words is all but uncontroversial. People disagree when trying to
categorize a speciﬁc noun as “abstract,” and even more when
classifying as such a speciﬁc verb. Evidence suggests that the
“abstract–concrete dimension” reﬂects a continuum rather than
a dichotomy. Indeed, Nelson and Schreiber (1992) and Wiemer-
Hastings et al. (2001) asked people to judge the concreteness of
large sets of words; they found a bimodal distribution (accord-
ing to features, such as tangibility or visibility), not a dichotomy.
Things are even more complicated when words are embedded
within contexts. Most of us would agree that the noun“apple” and
the verb “to grasp” are concrete, but judging verb–noun pairs such
as “to grasp the meaning,” or “to think about an apple” (e.g., Aziz-
Zadeh et al., 2006) is all but simple. In addition, the meaning of
a sentence is often inﬂuenced by a speciﬁc language and culture;
furthermore, it has been shown that this linguistic and cultural
inﬂuence is particularly strong for abstract compared to concrete
words (Boroditsky, 2003).
The study of how abstract concepts and words are represented
has been the focus of many investigations in the 1960s–1990s. The
two most inﬂuential views were the context availability theory
(CAT, Schwanenﬂugel, 1991) and the dual coding theory (DCT,
e.g., Paivio, 1986). CAT would ascribe the processing difference
between concrete and abstract words to the fact that concrete
words have stronger semantic relations with the context repre-
sented by other words. According to DCT, instead, abstract words
would be represented only in a linguistic system while concrete
words would be represented both in imagery and linguistic system.
As to theneural substrates of language comprehension, the inte-
gration of lesions analyses, white matter tractography, and resting
state functional magnetic resonance imaging (e.g., Dronkers et al.,
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2004;Turken andDronkers,2011)have recently brought intoques-
tion traditional models: not only the left posterior temporal cortex
but an extensive network in the left hemisphere seems to be critical
for the processing of language (e.g., left posterior middle temporal
gyrus,MTG; the anterior part of Brodmann’s area 22; the posterior
superior temporal sulcus). The investigation of the structural and
functional connectivity of the keys regions (using diffusion tensor
imaging) has shown a bilateral temporo-parieto-frontal network
supported by long-distance white matter pathways. This network
seems to interact with other brain regions outside the traditionally
recognized language areas (Turken and Dronkers, 2011). Pertain-
ing to the aim of the present work, in the last years we have assisted
a renewed interest for the way concrete and abstract words are
represented, as the growing body of brain imaging studies reveals
(e.g., Desai et al., 2010; Ghio and Tettamanti, 2010). Many of these
studies supported the original proposal by Paivio, showing for
example that processing of abstract words is more lateralized in
the left hemisphere than processing of concrete ones (for a review
see Binder et al., 2005).
In the same line, on the theoretical side it has been recently
proposed that language comprehension is both embodied and
symbolic (e.g., Louwerse and Jeauniaux, 2008; Dove, 2010). In
keeping with Paivio, Dove (2009, 2010) argues in favor of “repre-
sentational pluralism,” claiming that perceptual simulations play
an important role in highly imageable concepts while amodal
linguistic representations play a crucial role in abstract concepts.
One of the reasons of the renewed interest for abstract words is
that understanding the way we represent abstract words is a test-
bed for the increasingly popular (e.g., Chatterjee, 2010) embodied
theories of language comprehension, according to which lan-
guage is grounded in perception, action, and emotional system
(for reviews, see Barsalou, 2008; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Gallese,
2008). Whereas it is now widely recognized that the evidence in
support of embodied theories is compelling regarding concrete
or highly imageable words, the issue is much debated regarding
abstract words and sentences (Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2007;
Louwerse and Jeauniaux, 2008; Dove, 2010). Within the embod-
ied framework abstract words would be explained as the result of
the transfer in abstract domains of image-schemas derived from
sensorimotor experiences: for example, the image-schema derived
from “container”would be used to understand the notion of “cat-
egory” (Lakoff, 1987; Gibbs and Steen, 1999; Boot and Pecher,
2011), the action of giving a concrete object (pizza) would be used
to understand the action of giving some news (Glenberg et al.,
2008).Alternatively, it has beenproposed that abstractwords evoke
different kinds of properties, i.e., that they activate situations and
introspective relationships more frequently than concrete words
(Barsalou,1999; Barsalou andWiemer-Hastings, 2005; for a review
see Pecher et al., 2011).
More crucial to our work are some recent proposals which,
starting from an embodied perspective and avoiding assuming
the existence of amodal symbols, detached from perceptual and
motor experience, share with Paivio the idea that multiple types
of representation underlie knowledge (for a review see special
topic on Embodied and Grounded Cognition, Borghi and Pecher,
2011). These proposals differ from Paivio’s view as they hypothe-
size that not only concrete, but also abstract words are embodied
and grounded. According to the language and situated simulation
(LASS) theory (Barsalou et al., 2008), linguistic forms and situ-
ated simulations interact continuously and different mixtures of
the two systems underlie a wide variety of tasks. The linguistic
system (comprising the left-hemisphere language areas, and espe-
cially the left inferior frontal gyrus, Broca’s area) is involved mainly
during superﬁcial linguistic processing, whereas a deeper concep-
tual processing necessarily requires the simulation system, made
up of the bilateral posterior areas associated with mental imagery
and episodic memory.
The word as social tools (WAT) proposal (Borghi and Cimatti,
2009) differs from the LASS theory because, according toWAT, the
linguistic system does not simply involve a form of superﬁcial pro-
cessing: words are not conceived of as mere signals of something
but also as tools that allow us to operate in the world. In addition,
WAT extends LASS as it formulates more detailed predictions on
the representation of abstract and concrete words. Indeed, accord-
ing toWATabstract wordmeaningswould relymore than concrete
word meanings on the everyday experience of being exposed
to language in social contexts. According to WAT the difference
between abstract and concrete words basically relies on the dif-
ferent mode of acquisition (MoA; Wauters et al., 2003), which can
be perceptual, linguistic, or mixed. MoA ratings, which correlate
but are not totally explained by age of acquisition, concreteness,
and imageability, gradually change over grades. In the ﬁrst grades
acquisition is mainly perceptual, later it is mainly linguistic. It can
follow that abstract words are typically acquired later, also because
it is more difﬁcult to linguistically explain a word meaning than
to point at its referent while labeling. The acquisition of abstract
words, due to their complexity, typically require a long-lasting
social interaction, and it often implies complex linguistic expla-
nations and repetitions. In contrast, the process by which young
children learn concrete words appears effortless and often occurs
within a single episode of hearing the word spoken in context (e.g.,
Carey, 1978; see also Pulvermüller, in press). This has the conse-
quence that, even if for the representation of both concrete and
abstract words meanings sensorimotor and linguistic experience
are crucial, we rely more on language to understand the meaning
of concretewords,whereaswe relymore onnon-linguistic sensori-
motor experience to grasp the meaning of abstract words. (Borghi
andCimatti, 2009).Given that abstractwords donot have a speciﬁc
object or entity as referent, many of them might be acquired lin-
guistically, i.e., listening to other people explaining their content to
us, rather than perceptually. This might be due also to their differ-
ent degree of complexity: learning to use a word such as “lipstick”
is simpler than learning to use a word like“justice,”and the linguis-
tic label might be more crucial for keeping together experiences
as diverse as those related to the notion of “justice.” Borghi et al.
(2011) used novel categories to mimic the acquisition of concrete
and abstract concepts; they found that linguistic explanations are
more important for the acquisition of abstract than for concrete
words, and showed with a property veriﬁcation task that concrete
words evoke more manual information,while abstract words elicit
more verbal information. WAT hypothesizes also that the MoA
determines the representation of the word in our brain: when the
words refer to categories learned through sensorimotor experi-
ences (e.g., “bottle”), they have a much higher level of grounding
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in the perception and action systems than words learned mainly
through the mediation of other words (e.g., “democracy”; Borghi
et al., 2011; see also Prinz, 2002). Consistently, concrete words
should evoke more manual information, activating precociously
motor areas (Jirak et al., 2010; Pulvermüller, in press), whereas
abstract words should elicit more verbal-linguistic information,
activating precociously motor areas related to the mouth, as data
on transcranial magnetic stimulation study (Scorolli et al., 2011)
and on words acquisition modality suggest (Borghi et al., 2011).
Notice that claiming that concrete and abstract words are
acquired through different modalities does not require the postu-
lation of any difference in format between the two kinds of words,
nor any transduction from sensorimotor experience into amodal
symbols. It simply means that abstract word meanings should rely
more on the embodied experience of being exposed to language
than concrete word meanings. However,we do not intend to imply
that abstract words rely on the simple embodied experience of
speaking and listening – this would not sufﬁce to call their repre-
sentation embodied. In contrast with non-embodied approaches
to abstract words, in our view a word like“philosophy”would acti-
vate perceptual and motor experiences, together with linguistic
experience. As demonstrated by Borghi et al. (2011), with abstract
terms the advantage of linguistic over manual information was
present only when linguistic information did not contrast with
perceptual one.
The major difference between Paivio’s approach and multi-
ple representation theories such as WAT’s approach to concrete
and abstract words is that, according to the ﬁrst, abstract words
rely only on the verbal system, while for WAT both concrete and
abstract words are grounded in perception and action systems,
even if the linguistic system plays a major role for abstract words
representation.
The best way to disambiguate these hypotheses is the selec-
tion of a paradigm that allows contrasting abstract and concrete
words combined in sentences. So farmost evidence has been found
with brain imaging rather than with behavioral studies, it con-
cerns single words rather than words embedded in contexts, and
tasks requiring deep semantic processing are typically not used [an
exception is given by a recent fMRI study by Desai et al. (2010),
in which a sentence evaluation task was used]. In contrast, our
study focuses on how words meaning changes depending on the
context in which it is embedded. For this reason we will compare
not only whole abstract and concrete sentences, but also sentences
which result from a mixture of abstract and concrete nouns and
verbs in a well-balanced design. We believe this may represent an
important step for a systematic investigation of abstraction. One
of the advantages of this design resides in the possibility to study
abstractness in a continuum, and to verify the effects on com-
prehension using different combinations and studying how the
meaning of single words can change depending on the context.
In addition, focusing on sentences instead than on single words
offers the possibility to investigate linguistic processing in a more
ecological way, and allows us detecting eventual inﬂuences of the
different spoken languages.
In the present study we asked participants to judge the sen-
sibility of sentences. We chose this task because it is established
that it implies a deep semantic processing of the sentences (see
also Turken and Dronkers, 2011). Coherently with previous liter-
ature, we deﬁned as “concrete” only nouns that refer to manipu-
lable objects and only verbs referring to manual actions (e.g., “a
ﬂower”/“to grasp”). We decided to deﬁne as “abstract” only nouns
that do not refer to an object, rather to an entity that can neither be
grasped nor touched, and only verbs that refer to an action1 that
cannot be performed with any part of the body, that is, an action
that does not explicitly require any movement or any activation of
the motor system (e.g., “a concept”/“to describe”). In addition, to
investigate the speciﬁc effects of the speciﬁc language we use, we
examined different combinations of nouns (abstract and concrete
ones) and verbs (abstract and concrete ones), in two languages,
German and Italian, which are syntactically different: in German
the noun precedes the verb; in Italian it is the opposite.
There are several possible views:
1. No difference view: abstract and concrete concepts have the
same core representations. According to the amodal theories
their representations in the brain would be most probably in
the language domain; according to the strictly modal view both
concrete and abstract concepts would be represented in the
perception and action system.
2. Non-embodied multiple representation view: concrete and
abstract words have distinct representations: the ﬁrst are rep-
resented in the sensorimotor system, abstract words in the lan-
guage system. This view, proposed by Paivio (1986), is adopted
by multiple representation views not adopting an embodied
approach to abstract words, i.e., to views arguing that concrete
and abstract words differ in format (e.g., Binder et al., 2005;
Dove, 2010).
3. Embodied multiple representation view: abstract and concrete
concepts are represented both in the language domains and
in the perception and action systems. However, they are not
represented in the same way in the two systems but there is a
different distribution. Linguistic information should be more
relevant for abstract words, perception, and action information
for concrete ones. This is the view consistent with multiple rep-
resentation theories adopting an embodied perspective, such as
WAT and LASS.
In contrast with strictly amodal and strictly modal views (No dif-
ference views), both embodied and non-embodied multiple repre-
sentation views predict costs inmixed combinations,when switch-
ing from one perceptual modality to another (Pecher et al., 2003).
In addition, according to the WAT proposal mixed combinations
should be differently modulated by the syntactical structure of the
two different chosen languages. As the Age of Acquisition clearly
affects performance in semantic tasks (Lewis, 1999;Brysbaert et al.,
2000) and is correlated with the Modality of Acquisition, WAT
predicts that in mixed conditions RTs should be slower when the
abstract word precedes the concrete one, due to the fact that the
former is acquired later and relies more on linguistic informa-
tion than the second (Bloom, 2000; Colombo and Burani, 2002;
Mestres-Missé et al., 2009).
1Action thought in a more general way, as to also include cognitive processes, or
mental operations.
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EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-eight students from the University of Hamburg (group
I) and 38 students from the University of Bologna (group II)
took part in the study. All were native German speakers (group
I) or native Italian speakers (group II), right-handed according
to the Edinburgh Handedness Questionnaire (Oldﬁeld, 1971),
and all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They all gave
their informed consent to the experimental procedure. Their
ages ranged from 18 to 32 years old (German group: M = 26.26;
SD= 3.64; Italian Group: M = 24.61; SD= 3.58). The study was
approved by the local ethic committees.
MATERIALS
Materials consisted of word pairs (sentences) composed of a
transitive verb and a concept noun. To study the dimension
abstract–concrete in a continuumwecontrasted twokinds ofVerbs
(Concrete vs. Abstract) with two kinds of Nouns (Concrete vs.
Abstract). We deﬁned Concrete Nouns as nouns referring to gras-
pable objects, Concrete Verbs as verbs referring to hand actions,
Abstract Nouns as nouns that do not refer to manipulable objects,
and Abstract Verbs as verbs that do not refer to motor actions.
Therefore we created 192 sentences – 48 quadruples – in the Ger-
man language and 192 sentences – 48 quadruples – in the Italian
language. Each quadruple was constructed by pairing a Concrete
Verb (e.g., to grasp) both with a Concrete Noun (e.g., a ﬂower) and
anAbstract Noun (e.g., a concept); and by pairing anAbstract verb
(e.g., to describe) with the previously used concrete and abstract
nouns (e.g., to squeeze/ﬁnd a sponge/friendship; to lift/receive a
table/criticism; to caress/wait for a dog/idea; to bend/respect the
menu/will; to paint/admire the frame/sunset; to write/look for the
document/end; to carve out/wait for a newspaper/moment). We
decided to use sentences with a very simple grammatical structure
(a verb plus a noun) as it was not possible to developmore complex
sentences with a similar grammatical structure that fulﬁlled the
criteria of the quadruples. The majority of these sentences’ mean-
ings matched in both languages; a few of them slightly differed, as
some pairs did not allow for a literal translation.
Due to the different syntax of the German and Italian lan-
guages, the German sentences were composed of a noun followed
by a verb; the Italian ones were composed of a verb followed by
a noun. We chose to compare these two languages as the speciﬁc
differences in the syntactical structure allowed us to speculate on
the different effects caused by a verb preceded by a noun (German
sample) vs. a noun preceded by a verb (Italian sample).
To select 30 critical quadruples from the 48 ones, we asked 20
German students and 20 Italian students to judge how familiar
each sentence sounded and with what degree of probability they
would use each sentence. They were required to provide ratings
on a continuous scale (Not familiar – Very Familiar; Not proba-
bly – Very probably), by making a cross on a line. We selected the
quadruples with highest scores for both familiarity and probabil-
ity of use, and, from these, we ﬁnally chose the quadruples with
lower scores in the SDs. Thus we obtained 120 verb–noun pairs
(balanced for familiarity and probability of use).
Due to the peculiarity of our linguistic materials, to further test
if the 120 selected verb–noun pairs differed as far as the frequency
of use is concerned, we checked on the research engine “Google”
the frequency of each pair, by using quotations marks (Page et al.,
1998; Grifﬁths et al., 2007; Sha, 2010). The frequencies were sub-
mitted to a 2 (kind of Noun: Concrete vs. Abstract) × 2 (kind of
Verb: Concrete vs. Abstract)× 2 (Language: German vs. Italian)
ANOVA. Crucially we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effect. This fur-
ther control on written frequency prevented us from accounting
for possible differences on processing resting on different associa-
tion degrees between words pairs composing German and Italian
quadruples.
In addition to the 30 critical quadruples, we created 30 ﬁller
quadruples using the same criteria. We combined a concrete verb
bothwith a concrete noun andwith an abstract noun; andwe com-
bined an abstract verb with the same concrete noun and abstract
noun, leading to nonsensical sentences (e.g., “to switch off the
shoe”). Each quadruple was presented only once.
PROCEDURE
German and Italian participants were randomly assigned to one
of two groups. Members of both groups were tested individually
in a quiet library room. They sat on a comfortable chair in front of
a computer screen and were instructed to look at a ﬁxation cross
that remained on the screen for 1000 ms. Then a sentence appeared
on the screen for 2600 ms. The German sentences were composed
of a determinative or non-determinative article plus a noun plus
a verb (example for the concrete noun – concrete verb combina-
tion: “einen Kuchen anschneiden,” to cut a cake), while the Italian
sentences were composed of a verb plus a determinative or non-
determinative article plus a noun (example for the concrete verb
– concrete noun combination: “stringere una spugna,” to squeeze
a sponge).
The timer started operating when the sentence appeared on the
screen. For each verb–noun pair, participants were instructed to
press one key if the combination made sense, and to press another
key if the combination did not make sense.
Participants in the ﬁrst group (both German and Italian) were
asked to respond“yes”with their left hand and“no”with their right
hand; participants in the other group (both German and Italian)
were required to do the opposite. All participants were informed
that their response times (RT) would be recorded and were invited
to respond as quickly as possible while still maintaining accuracy.
Stimuli were presented in a random order. The 240 experimen-
tal trials were preceded by 8 training trials, in order to allow the
participants to familiarize themselves with the procedure.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
In our analyses we considered only the sensible sentences. Par-
ticipants were accurate in responding; no participant’s responses
included errors over 15%. To screen for outliers, scores 2 SDs
higher or lower than the mean participant score were removed
for each participant. Removed outliers accounted for 3.6% of
response trials. The remaining RT and errors were submitted
to a 2 (kind of Noun: Concrete vs. Abstract) × 2 (kind of Verb:
Concrete vs. Abstract)× 2 (Mapping: yes-right/no-left vs. yes-
left/no-right)× 2 [Language: German: noun (ﬁrst), verb (second)
vs. Italian: noun (second), verb (ﬁrst)] mixed factor ANOVA,
with Mapping and Language as between-participants variables.
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We conducted the analyses with participants as a random factor.
As the error analysis revealed that there was no speed–accuracy
trade-off, we will discuss only the RT analysis
ASSESSMENT OF GERMAN AND ITALIAN PAIRS
Materials were controlled regarding a variety of dimensions. 30
students from the University of Hamburg and 30 students from
the University of Bologna were asked to rate the ease or difﬁculty
with which each pair evoked mental images (imageability: Low
imagery rate – High Imagery rate) on a continuous scale (scores
ranging from 0 to 100); how literally they would take each pair (lit-
erality: Literal – No Literal); whether and to what extent each pair
elicited movement information (quantity of motion: Not much
movement – Much movement). Finally 10 German students and
10 Italian students were asked to rate at which age approximately
they had learned to use each pair (age of acquisition ratings). For
each rating, we calculated the scores’ averages and the scores’ SDs
for each condition.
Imageability
Both German and Italian participants judged the Concrete Verb
– Concrete Noun pairs as the easiest to imagine (see Figure 1,
Germans: M= 69.10; SD= 12.76; Italians: M= 77.74; SD= 8.49),
followed by the Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (Ger-
mans:M= 52.72; SD= 15.80; Italians:M= 51.33; SD= 18.65), by
the Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (Germans: M= 48.53;
SD= 12.92; Italians: M= 46.33; SD= 12.36), and ﬁnally by
Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (Germans: M= 45.56;
SD= 14.51; Italians: M= 44.88; SD= 15.23). Results showed that
German and Italian participants had the same pattern: the pair
containing two concrete words was judged as the easiest to imag-
ine. Moreover for both groups the noun was stronger than the verb
in determining the imageability of the sentence.
Literality–metaphoricity
German participants rated the Abstract verb – Concrete noun
pairs as the ones that they would take most literally (see Figure 2,
M= 18.89; SD= 13.72), followed by the Concrete Verb – Con-
crete Noun pairs (M= 20.22; SD= 18.12), by the Abstract Verb –
Abstract Noun pairs (M= 31.23; SD= 19.59), and ﬁnally by the
Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (M= 56.95; SD= 19.01).
Italian participants rated the ConcreteVerb – Concrete Noun pairs
as the sentences that they would take most literally (M= 11.42;
SD= 4.57), followed by the Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun pairs
(M= 31.33; SD= 13.11), by the Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun
pairs (M= 59.42; SD= 13.63), and ﬁnally by Concrete Verb –
Abstract Noun pairs (M= 69.50; SD= 11.78).
The sentences rated asmore literal are the oneswhich contained
a Concrete Verb plus a Concrete Noun for Italian participants and
containing an Abstract Verb plus a Concrete Noun for German
participants. Both groups judged the combination Concrete Verb
– Abstract Noun as the most metaphorical one. It is worth noting
that while the concrete noun meaning remains the same through
the quadruples, the concrete verb meaning, as well as its concrete-
ness/abstractness, changes through the quadruples, depending on
the context: for example, the meaning of the verb “to grasp” is not
the same in“grasping an apple”and in“grasping a concept”(Parisi,
personal communication).
Quantity of motion
German participants rated the Concrete Verb – Concrete Noun
pairs as the ones that elicited most movement information (see
Figure 3, M= 34.29; SD= 13.95), followed by the Concrete
Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (M= 27.22; SD= 12.82), by the
Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (M= 17.98; SD= 13.87)
and ﬁnally by Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (M= 13.99;
SD= 7.39). Interestingly, the Italian participants’ pattern was
different, as they rated the Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun
pairs as the ones that mainly elicited movement informa-
tion (M= 42.56; SD= 13.28), followed by the Abstract Verb
– Abstract Noun pairs (M= 35.05; SD= 12.24), by the Con-
crete Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (M= 31.93; SD= 10.58) and
ﬁnally by the Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (M= 21.56;
SD= 11.25).
FIGURE 1 | German and Italian participants had the same pattern: the pair containing both words concrete was judged as the easiest to imagine.
Moreover for both groups the noun was stronger than the verb in determining the imageability of the sentences.
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FIGURE 2 | Both groups judged the combination ConcreteVerb plus Abstract Noun as the most metaphorical one. Note: while the concrete noun
meaning remains the same through the quadruples, the concrete verb meaning, as well as its concreteness/abstractness, changes through the quadruples,
depending on the context.
FIGURE 3 | Both groups agreed in judging the AbstractVerb plus
Concrete Noun combination as the one that elicits less movement.The
main difference concerns the Concrete Verb plus Abstract Noun vs. Concrete
Verb plus Concrete Noun combinations: the former suggested the biggest
amount of movement for Italian participants; the latter evoked the huger
quantity of motion in German participants.
Both groups agreed in judging the Abstract Verb – Concrete
Noun combination as the one that elicits lessmovement. Themain
difference concerns the combinations Concrete Verb – Abstract
Noun vs. Concrete Verb – Concrete Noun combination, as while
the former suggested the biggest amount of movement for Ital-
ian participants, the latter evoked the larger quantity of motion in
German participants.
Age of acquisition
A number of studies (Gilhooly and Gilhooly, 1980; Zevin and
Seidenberg, 2002) have demonstrated the validity of age of acqui-
sition ratings, by showing that age rated by adults is the major
independent predictor of the objective age of acquisition indices.
In our study German participants rated the Concrete Verb –
Concrete Noun pairs as the ones they learnt ﬁrst (see Figure 4,
M= 7.82 years old; SD= 2.21), followed by the Abstract Verb
– Concrete Noun pairs (M= 8.64 years old; SD= 2.55), and
ﬁnally by both Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun pairs and Con-
crete Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (M= 10.24 years old; SD= 2.35;
M= 10.74 years old; SD= 1.95). The pattern was the same for
Italian participants who rated the ConcreteVerb – Concrete Noun
pairs as the earliest learnt ones (M= 6.63 years old; SD= 1.97), fol-
lowed by the AbstractVerb – Concrete Noun pairs (M= 8.33 years
old; SD= 2.34), and ﬁnally by bothAbstractVerb –Abstract Noun
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FIGURE 4 | Results suggest that the different age of acquisition of sentences is explained by the noun: as shown in the literature on single word age
of acquisition, the concrete noun is learned before than the abstract one.
FIGURE 5 |The interaction among the kind of Language, the kind of Noun, and the kind ofVerb, p<0.03. German participants were faster with Abstract
Verb plus Concrete Noun, than with Concrete Verb plus Abstract Noun.The pattern of the Italian participants was opposite.
pairs and Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (M= 10.45 years
old; SD= 2.09; M= 10.74 years old; SD= 2.25). Results suggest
that the different age of acquisition of sentences is explained by
the noun: as shown in the literature regarding single word age of
acquisition, the concrete noun is learned before the abstract one.
Consistently, we found that sentences containing a concrete noun,
even if in combination with an abstract verb, are acquired earlier
than sentences containing an abstract noun.
RESULTS
Neither a main effect of the kind of Mapping nor a main effect
of the Language used was found. Crucially, we found a sig-
niﬁcant interaction between the kind of Noun and the kind
of Verb: German and Italian participants responded faster to
both kinds of congruent pairs, that is both to pairs composed
of an Abstract Verb plus an Abstract Noun (M = 1172.56 ms)
and to pairs composed of a Concrete Verb plus a Con-
crete Noun (M = 1168.83 ms). Consecutively they were slower
with the mixed pairs, that is, with pairs composed of an
Abstract Verb plus a Concrete Noun (M = 1211.95 ms) and
pairs composed of a Concrete Verb plus an Abstract Noun
(M = 1206.81 ms), F(1, 72)= 48.83, MSe= 2328.79, p< 0.0001.
Interestingly, Abstract Verbs combined with Abstract Nouns did
not require a longer processing time than Concrete Verbs –
Concrete Nouns pairs.
We also found a signiﬁcant three-way interaction between
Language, kind of Noun, and kind of Verb, F(1, 72)= 5.07,
MSe= 2328.79, p< 0.03, see Figure 5. Newman–Keuls post hoc
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analyses showed that German participants, noun (ﬁrst), verb (sec-
ond), were 13.25 ms faster with Abstract Verb plus Concrete Noun
pairs than with Concrete Verb plus Abstract Noun pairs; on the
contrary, Italian participants, noun (second), verb (ﬁrst), were
23.51 ms faster with Concrete verb plus Abstract Noun pairs
than with Abstract Verb plus Concrete Noun pairs; this differ-
ence reached signiﬁcance only for Italian participants, p< 0.04.
As the syntactic construction of German and Italian is different
for pairs containing a transitive verb plus an object–noun, Ger-
man participants, differently from Italians, were presented with
the noun preceding the verb. Results with mixed pairs indicate
that participants were faster when the ﬁrst word was concrete
rather than when it was abstract – that is when it referred to
an object on which we can perform an action involving the
hands (German pairs), or to an action performed with the hands
(Italian pairs). This suggests that the degree of abstractness of
the word plays a more important role than its grammatical
class.
Moreover, the interaction between Language and kind of
Verb almost reached signiﬁcance as well, F(1, 72)= 3.68,
MSe= 3490.70, p< 0.06. German participants, noun (ﬁrst), verb
(second), were 8.57 ms faster with pairs containing Abstract Verbs
thanwith pairs containingConcreteVerbs.On the contrary, Italian
participants, noun (second), verb (ﬁrst), were 17.42 ms slower
with pairs containing Abstract Verbs than with the pairs contain-
ing Concrete Verbs. Integrating these results with those obtained
previously allows us to speculate that word’s concreteness vs.
abstractness strongly determines the time necessary to process
the sentence (three-way interaction), but also that the verb has
a stronger effect than the noun.
DISCUSSION
Our study showed three main new results. First we found that both
the abstract verb – abstract noun combinations and the concrete
verb – concrete noun combinations were processed faster than
the mixed combinations. This in itself is new, particularly consid-
ering the fact that it is well known that the sentence evaluation
task we used implies accessing to deep semantic representation.
Our results on mixed pairs are not predicted by the No difference
explanation (view 1); instead, they are predicted by views 2 and 3,
and are consistent with the idea that concrete and abstract words
activate parallel systems, one relying more on purely perception
and action areas, the other more on sensorimotor linguistic areas.
Indeed, switching between systems implies a cost in RTs, whereas
remaining within the same system does not affect performance.
This effect per se favors theories implying multiple types of rep-
resentation over strictly modal and strictly amodal theories (this
issue is addressed more extensively in the second section of the
discussion).
The second major result we found is the three-way interac-
tion between Language, kind of Verb, and kind of Noun. This
interaction was mainly due to the fact that Germans’ and Ital-
ians’ results on mixed combinations were the opposite: German
participants, noun (ﬁrst), verb (second), were faster with abstract
verb and concrete noun combinations than with concrete verb
and abstract noun combinations; Italian participants, noun (sec-
ond), verb (ﬁrst), showed a mirror pattern. This result can be
easily accounted for if we consider that the word presentation
order differed across the two languages: German participants
saw the noun ﬁrst and then the verb, while Italians saw the
same combination in a reverse order. Thus, participants were
faster when the ﬁrst word shown in the sentence was a con-
crete one, regardless of its grammatical class (verb vs. noun) and
of the spoken language (German vs. Italian; for a similar result
see Paivio, 1965: differently from us, in a learning and recall
task he contrasted only abstract and concrete nouns, rather than
sentences).
The third result is the marginally signiﬁcant interaction we
found between Language and kind of Verb. Integrating the last
two ﬁndings, it seems that the abstractness vs. concreteness of
the ﬁrst word – that depends on the different sentences’ struc-
tures – modulates sentence processing more strongly (interaction
Language×Noun×Verb) than its grammatical class. Neverthe-
less it seems to be also an effect of the linguistic category, as verbs
are more powerful than nouns in inﬂuencing subjects’ responses.
Fascinatingly, this result could be in keeping with the idea that
the grammatical structure of a language shapes to some extent
its speakers’ perception of the world (Boroditsky, 2003; Gentner,
2003; Mirolli and Parisi, 2009).
Let us now consider results from RTs together, integrating them
with the results obtained from the ratings of the materials. We will
discuss how each theory could account for them and the problems
each theory faces. We will also provide a possible neuroanatomical
explanation of the results.
1. No difference view: abstract and concrete concepts have the
same core representations.
According to both (a) amodal (e.g., Fodor, 1998) and (b)
strictly modal (e.g., Barsalou, 1999) theories of concepts and
words, concrete, and abstract sentences are represented in the
same format (amodal vs. modal). Therefore, for both amodal
and modal views we should expect no difference between the
four conditions, unless these differences are explained by asso-
ciation degree and familiarity for amodal theories, and by
imageability for modal theories.
(a) According to amodal theories the results should be explained
resting on the association rate between words. Therefore, the
advantage of congruent overmixed sentences should be due to
a higher association rate of these pairs compared to that of the
mixed combinations. To check for this possibility, we calcu-
lated the familiarity and the probability of use score averages
in each condition for the 120 pairs selected for the behavioral
experiment. Ratings showed that, for both German and Ital-
ian participants, the advantage of congruent combinations
over the mixed pairs is not explained by a supposed higher
familiarity or higher probability of use of the ﬁrst.
(b) According to a strictly modal theory, results regarding RT
should be explained by imageability rating. An approach
based more on metaphors (Lakoff, 1987) should account for
the behavioral results considering the literality ratings (that
indirectly give us information on the degree of metaphoric-
ity). Actually the advantage for the Concrete Verb – Con-
crete Noun combination can be explained resting on its
high imageability, low metaphoricity rate, and precocious
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age of acquisition. But neither the modal theory nor the
approach based on metaphors was veriﬁed by our results
on Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun pairs, which were nei-
ther imageable nor literal (as opposed to being metaphorical)
but provoked a response that was as fast as that for Con-
creteVerb–Concrete Noun pairs. Finally, an approach propos-
ing that words are grounded in perceptual and especially in
motor systems (Glenberg, 1997) would predict a relationship
between thebehavioral data and thequantity of motion scores.
This was not the case, however, as the amount of movement
evoked by the sentence did not explain the pattern of results
with RT. Therefore, we can conclude that neither a strictly
amodal nor a strictly modal theory adequately accounts for
our results.
2. Non-embodied multiple representation view and
3. Embodied multiple representation view.
Theories based on multiple types of representation – both
in their non-embodied vs. embodied version – can explain
the difference between congruent and mixed pairs more eas-
ily, even if resting on different reasons, that is: (I) differ-
ent kinds of formats (still assuming a transduction process:
Dove, 2009), or (II) a shift between different kinds of
modalities, i.e., linguistic vs. a sensorimotor coding (LASS,
WAT).
The interpretation that better accommodates our results
assumes that abstract words are processed predominantly in the
language system and concrete words are processed in the sensori-
motor system to a larger extent. If processing occurs in separate
systems, then the switching between concrete and abstract would
imply not only conceptual costs, but also costs connected with
switching between anatomical systems working in parallel. Within
each system (concrete–concrete vs. abstract–abstract) the costs
remain low. Some recent pieces of evidence are in line with our
results. In a brain imaging study on abstract words Rüschemeyer
et al. (2007) found that the processing of verbs with motor
meanings (e.g., “to grasp”) differed from the processing of verbs
with abstract meanings (e.g., “to think”). Motor verbs produced
greater signal changes than abstract verbs in several regions within
the posterior premotor, primary motor (M1), and somatosen-
sory (S1) cortices, as well as in secondary somatosensory (S2)
cortex. More crucially, our interpretation is also consistent with
results obtained in a brain imaging study performed using the
same paradigm as the one used in the present work (Menz et al.,
2011; see also Jirak et al., 2010). Using quadruples containing
every possible combination for motor/non-motor verbs and for
graspable/non-graspable objects, evidence showed that all motor
areas were activated by language stimuli with both concrete and
abstract content; but in case of concrete verb plus concrete noun
processing there was a stronger engagement of areas typically
involved in planning of complex and goal-directed actions (e.g.,
frontal operculum). In case of abstract verb plus abstract noun
combinations, instead, there was a stronger engagement of the
supramarginal gyrus (SMG) – typically involved in motor plan-
ning (e.g., Tunik et al., 2008) but also during phonological and
articulatorywordsprocessing (e.g.,Celsis et al., 1999;Pattamadilok
et al., 2010) –, as well as of the MTG – that is also recruited
when performing tasks critical in communication and social inter-
action (Mellet et al., 1998; Binder et al., 2005; Sabsevitz et al.,
2005).
3. Embodied multiple representation view.
The advantage of non-mixed combinations (AA and CC) on
the mixed ones (AC and CA) rules out the No difference views
but can be accounted by both the Non-embodied (2) and the
Embodied versions of multiple representations views (3). In order
to disentangle them, the most critical result is the advantage we
found when the ﬁrst word was a concrete one. A Non-embodied
multiple representation view (2) has difﬁculties in explaining
this result: since the task used in the present study is a linguis-
tic one, it should be easier to process ﬁrst words which activate
linguistic information, i.e., abstract words, rather than concrete
ones.
LASS ANDWAT
Both LASS andWAT can explain the advantage of the ﬁrst concrete
word. However, the explanation based on LASS would be a posteri-
ori. The argument would be that, even if the task is a linguistic one,
it requires deep semantic processing, and this might require more
time for abstract than for concrete words. A more straightforward
explanation of the longer RTs when the ﬁrst word is an abstract
rather than a concrete one derives from the WAT proposal. WAT
assumes that both linguistic and sensorimotor processing have the
same status – coherent with the advantage of the AA and CC pairs
on the mixed pairs –, and it treats the issue of concepts represen-
tation as strictly related to their acquisition, stressing the different
function of linguistic label for concrete vs. abstract word mean-
ings. So the advantage of concrete words when presented ﬁrst
would be due to the fact that abstract words are learnt differently
from concrete ones, and often with the help of a verbal explana-
tion (see Borghi et al., 2011). It follows that for the acquisition of
abstract terms the social experience due to the presence of oth-
ers explaining to us speciﬁc word meanings is particularly crucial.
In support of this interpretation it is worth noting that in the
linguistic materials’ ratings we basically found the same patterns
for Imageability and Age of acquisition for both Germans and
Italians: sentences containing a concrete noun (even if in combi-
nation with an abstract verb) were the easiest to imagine, and they
were acquired earlier than sentences containing abstract nouns.
Conversely German and Italian participants showed different pat-
terns as far as Metaphoricity and Quantity of Motion ratings are
concerned, thus they were differently inﬂuenced by the speciﬁc
linguistic milieu.
In sum
The results of our behavioral study showed that participants
were faster with congruent combinations, and that with mixed
combinations they were faster when the ﬁrst word was a concrete
one, independently of the spoken language and of the word gram-
matical class. Results are in linewith those embodied views, such as
LASS and WAT, according to which both linguistic and perception
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and action experience play a role in accounting for word repre-
sentation. The WAT proposal is able to explain the advantage of
the ﬁrst concrete word better than the LASS view, ascribing it to
the fact that abstract words require more time as a consequence of
their peculiar acquisition modality.
Our results have a variety of implications as to how concrete
and abstractwords are represented in the brain, as they suggest that
linguistic and perception and action information are differently
distributed in accounting for concrete and abstract meanings.
Consistently with recent brain imagining study (Rüschemeyer
et al., 2007; Menz et al., 2011), we hypothesize that words with
concrete motor content are processed to a greater extent in the
perception and action systems than words with abstract content,
which in turn are processed more in the linguistic areas.
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